THE ROLE OF CORPORATE ZAKAT ON OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIAN FIRMS by Talattov, Abrapuspa Ghani et al.
 
 
THE ROLE OF CORPORATE ZAKAT ON OPTIMAL 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM 
MALAYSIAN FIRMS 
 
 
 
Abrapuspa Ghani Talattov 
1
 
Nur Azura Sanusi 
2
 
Suhal Kusairi 
3
 
Abu Hassan Shaari 
4
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In the finance literature, the relationship between capital structure and firm 
value has been extensively investigated, both theoretically and empirically. The 
main issue on corporate finance is how firms dealing with the important decision 
of capital structure. In this study, a model of capital structure is formulated in 
which corporate tax and zakat payment exist by firms into the consideration of 
combination of debt and equity. The theoretical model as shown by comparative 
statics prove the implication which is negatively relationship between leverage of 
the firm and the corporate zakat payment. Meanwhile, the empirical evidence 
reveals several implication as follows, (1) tax deduction reduces the current liability 
item relative to the firms that prefer equity financing, (2) the significant of zakat is 
consistent with the theoretical model that zakat would encourage firm to issue 
more equity than debt, (3) the strong significant relationship between return on 
assets with the leverage are the leading indicator of capital structure in all models. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the finance literature, the relationship between capital 
structure and firm value has been extensively investigated, both 
theoretically and empirically. The main issue on corporate finance is 
how firms dealing with the important decision of capital structure. 
However, as Ahmad et al. (2012) stated that capital structure decisions 
represent an important financial decision of a business organization 
apart from investment decisions. It is important since capital structure 
involves the cost of capital and long term implications for the firms.  
According to Datta et al. (2013), the term of capital structure is 
used to represent the proportional relationship between debt and 
equity. Capital structure refers to the way a corporation finances its 
assets through some combination of equity, debt, or hybrid securities. 
In addition, Gleason et al. (2000) appointed that the utilization of 
such firm-specific strategy used by managers in the way for improved 
performance. Hence, most firms have strived to achieve an optimal 
capital structure in order to minimize the cost of capital or to maximize 
the firm value, thereby improving its competitive advantage in the 
marketplace through a mixture of debt and equity financing. Thus, 
selecting the right type of debt is an equally important issue as opting 
for an appropriate debt to equity ratio. 
Discussion of optimal capital structure started by Scott (1976) 
and then Bradley et al. (1984). Both papers tried to elaborate optimal 
capital structure with comparative statics and simulation models. 
However, Scott (1976) attested the positive impact of the liquidation 
firm to  the optimal capital structure. While, Bradley at al. (1984) have 
developed a model that synthesizes the modern balancing theory of 
optimal capital structure. Their model incorporate positive personal 
taxes on equity and on bond income, expected costs of financial 
distress, and positive non-debt tax shieds. Previously, Miller (1977) has 
produced the formula to calculate the gains from using leverage by 
synthesizing differences in corporate income tax rates as well as 
personal tax rates on interest, dividends, and capital gain.  
Later, Haugen and Senbet (1988) proposed bankruptcy cost and 
agency cost as a significant contribution to the optimal capital 
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structure. The majority of researches on corporate capital structure 
focuses on searching for an optimal capital structure, which derives 
from the trade-off theory. Optimums normally require a trade-off, for 
example, between the tax advantages of borrowed money and the 
costs of financial distress when the firm funds it has borrowed too 
much. Numerous factors have profound impacts 
of capital structure. So, in order to develop an optimal capital 
structure, finance managers have to consider those factors that arise 
from the market imperfections such as corporate taxes, costs of 
financial distress, and agency costs. 
As already mentioned before, the financial managers have to 
ensure the fully utilization of corporate taxes to shield taxable income 
as much as possible. By doing so, they could enable firms to avoid a 
certain amount of corporate taxes. As a result, it will make these firms 
better off as they have more money to pay for investors and hence 
enhance their own value. On the other hand, as Rasiah and Kim 
(2011) stressed that firms should also make sure that the interest tax 
shield of debts is equivalent to the costs of financial distress. More 
importantly, since most of the financial distress costs are hard to 
measure accurately and whereby it may bring on other significant 
costs that would cut down the value of firms. Therefore, the need of 
balance the tax benefits of debt against the cost of financial distress is 
indispensable for the diminishing of these momentous costs.  
Meanwhile, there is an alternative for tax payments which is 
zakat payment. Since zakat payment is an alternative for tax payments 
in Malaysia, it is interesting to see how does the presence of zakat 
have influence to capital structure decisions. Until now, the Malaysian 
government has provided incentives to promote zakat payment for 
companies. According to Badawi (2004), it had been announced that 
any zakat which is paid by the company to the State Islamic Religious 
Councils (SIRCs) will be granted as an allowable deduction in the 
computation of the corporate tax. However, the amount of deduction 
is limited to 2.5 per cent of the aggregate income (Badawi, 2004; 
Bakar, 2007; Othman, 2013). 
However, Booth et al. (2001) claimed that the test of capital 
structure policy should be consider some characteristics such as 
institutional, cultural, and economic factors that are significantly 
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different among countries. Further, given the unique system of 
Malaysian business in terms of the existence of corporate zakat, an 
examination the role of zakat on capital structure policy in Malaysia 
should be valuable in yielding new insights on capital structure theory. 
Further, this study tries to develop the model of Islamic capital 
structure theory by take into account the zakat payment as factor that 
could be affect capital structure policy. Despite many theories may 
explain the conventional capital structure theory. This study will focus 
on the introduction of zakat in the conventional static trade-off theory 
developed by Miller (1977) and Bradley et al. (1984). 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Discourse of Capital Structure Theory 
The capital structure as the most important parameter in 
evaluating companies performance must be considered by manager. 
Even, management has to afford to determine the capital structure 
due to identify an ideal combination of financial sources in each 
company, in order to increase the firm value. Choosing an ideal 
value in the market.  
The debate over the decision about the optimal capital structure 
of the company has been ignited by the seminal work of Modigliani & 
Miller (1958). They have illustrated that without market imperfections 
of the perfect capital market, capital structure decisions of the 
company have failed to make an impact on the value of the company. 
In other words about the financing mix, the company does not have to 
worry about it. Since then, a large number of competition theory and 
empirical research from around the world appeared, introducing 
capital market imperfections. 
Since then, a convolute of academic papers emerged testing the 
theory. In essence, the subsequent capital structure theories have in 
common that include certain market imperfections, which are 
considered to be the driving force for firm value enhancement. In their 
corrected version of the classic and 
Miller (1963) showed that when corporate tax is taken into 
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consideration, the firm value becomes an increasing function of debt. 
Debt financing is viewed as more advantageous than equity because 
using more debt reduces the expected tax liability and increases the 
after tax cash flow.  
Furthermore, in corporate finance there exists a large body of 
literature that examines the financing behaviour of firms, reflected by 
their capital structure. However, based on Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973), research in the capital structure field is dominated by three 
theories: trade-off, pecking order and agency costs theory. Each 
theory presents a different explanation of corporate financing. The 
trade-off theory incorporates two imperfections, taxes and bankruptcy 
costs in the theoretical model in order to determine optimal capital 
structure decision of firms (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Kraus & 
Litzenberger, 1973). The notion of this theory is basically that firms 
need to weight the benefits of debt taxes with the costs of 
bankruptcy.  
Meanwhile, the pecking order theory assumes hierarchal 
financing decisions where firms depend first on internal sources of 
financing and, if these are less than the investment requirements, the 
firm seeks external financing from debt as a second source, then 
equity as the last resort (Myers, 1984). Moreover, the agency costs 
theory assumes that debt presents fixed obligations (debt interests and 
principals to pay) that have to be met by the firm. These obligations 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977).  
As stressed by Myers (2001) that the three theories are 
assumptions and propositions. That is, none of the three theories can 
give a complete picture of the practice of capital structure. This means 
that firms can pursue capital structure strategies that are conditional 
as well. That means that when the business conditions change, the 
financing decisions and strategies may change, moving from one 
theory to another.  
However, despite research in the capital structure field has been 
dominated by three main theories: the trade-off theory, pecking order 
264   Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 1, No.2, February 2016 
 
theory, and agency costs theory. Further, this study will focus on the 
trade-off theory only.  
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) formulated the classical version 
of trade-off theory. They stated that the optimal leverage level reflects 
a trade-off between the tax shield benefits of debt and the bankruptcy 
costs. The two proponents of the theory showed that, for a specific 
period (one year, for instance), the market value of a levered firm is 
equal to the market value of an unlevered firm, to which is added the 
present value of the tax shield of debt less the present value of 
bankruptcy costs. However, corporate tax and bankruptcy costs are 
the central market frictions on which the tax-based trade-off theory is 
established. 
As discussed previously, the static trade-off theory emerged in 
the streamline of the path-breaking irrelevance theorem. Static trade-
off theory, focus on the repayment and costs of issuing debt, predicts 
that an attractive target debt ratio is to make the paramount value of 
the company. The best point can be accomplished when the marginal 
value of the payback is linked with debt concerns exactly offsets the 
rise in the present value of the costs correlated by handing out more 
debt, as Myers (2001) point out. Moreover, the main benefit of debt is 
the tax deductibility of interest payments. The tax deduction of 
corporate interest payments supports the application of debt. Under 
the trade-off theory, Bradley et al. (1984) point out that the firms have 
a target debt ratio and try to move towards this target. The target 
leverage ratio occurs when the marginal benefit of tax equals the 
marginal cost of an additional unit of debt.  
Furthermore, the static trade-off theory explained that each firm 
has a well-defined optimal capital structure, which balances the 
benefits and costs associated with debt financing. The main benefits 
of debt include (i) tax deductibility gained by tax paying firms 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963), and (ii) advantages of using debt to 
mitigate the agency costs of equity and the free cash flow problem 
(e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). The costs of debt can 
be identified as (i) non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980), 
and (ii) agency costs of debt due to suboptimal investment behaviour 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), or underinvestment problem (Myers, 
1977).  
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However, the determination of debt also be influenced by the 
existence of other non-debt tax shields such as depreciation, 
allowances for research and development expenses and investment tax 
credit. According to DeAnglo and Masulis (1980), indicated that firms 
with tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits can 
consider these deductions as a substitute for the tax shield. Then, they 
revealed that there is a negative connection between debt and non-
debt tax shield.  
As stressed earlier, the most significant reason that prompt firms 
to raise debts are due to the tax shield that results from the tax savings 
generated by making interest payments on debt. As a result, by using 
debt, estimated tax liability of firms could be deducted and thus 
increase its after-tax cash flow, causing more lucrative business to 
utilize higher level of debt for the sake of increasing their debt tax 
shield. Nonetheless, debt financing not only produce benefit, but also 
yield costs such as interest, agency costs, bankruptcy cost, etc. 
Therefore, firms have to consider costs of both debt and equity in 
order to maximize its value. 
Besides, a firm can maximize its value by issuing as much debts 
as possible, but if the firm is using too much debt in its capital 
structure, there is a higher possibility that the firm cannot meet its 
interest and principal payment and will default on its debt obligations. 
More specifically, a firm that has difficulty and trouble meeting its debt 
obligations is in financial distress. However, the static trade-off theory 
incorporates the bankruptcy and agency costs along with the tax 
saving benefits in the balance. 
 
2.2  The Presence of Zakat in Malaysian Business 
As already discussed previously, the most significant reason that 
stimulate firms to raise debts are due to the tax . Interestingly, there is 
an alternative for corporate tax payment namely zakat payment 
(Sanusi, 2014). Until now, the discourse on zakat generally and zakat 
payment in the business environment in particular has been steadily 
expanding. But, still few research which considering zakat payment as 
factor that could influence capital structure decision (such as Barakat & 
Rao, 2003; Sanusi, 2014).  
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A previous study by Barakat and Rao (2003, p. 18), have tried to 
the interaction between zakat and corporate tax in order to find out 
its effect on the capital structure decision in Arab countries. However, 
they found that the effective tax rate together with zakat generates 
debt financing in Arab countries. Meanwhile, the fundamental work 
by Sanusi (2014) reveals that the leverage ratio for firms that pay zakat 
is smaller than the firms that only pay tax. In addition, Sanusi (2014) 
also claims that zakat able to increase the equity financing by reducing 
the use of leverage. However, as Sanusi (2014) question whether the 
existence of zakat triger an advantages or a disadvantages instead for 
the utilization of debt financing is unclear. 
However, since Malaysia is the few country in the world, where 
zakat payments are deducted from the income tax. This study will 
designate Malaysia as base for construct Islamic capital structure. In 
2005, Malaysian government was announced that any corporate zakat 
paid to State Islamic Religious Councils (SIRCs) will be considered as an 
allowable deduction. Moreover, Bakar (2007) asserted that more 
Malaysian companies are becoming aware and more interested in 
fulfilling their zakat obligation.  
According to Bakar (2007), all aspects pertaining to the 
administration of zakat are handled by the states through their 
respective State Islamic Religious Councils (SIRCs). Zakat administration 
comes under the jurisdiction of the respective state or the prerogative 
of its ruler (sultan). The only exception is the Federal Territory, where 
the zakat law and administration are governed by the federal 
government. Accordingly, each state formulates its own policy on 
zakat matters, including the method of collection, disbursement 
policy, administrative aspects, execution, and the degree of 
enforcement. 
Meanwhile, the basic principle of zakat on corporate wealth is 
based on merchandise goods (`urud al-tijarah), namely, anything 
obtained for the purpose of trading to gain a profit. The wealth 
becomes zakatable once it exceeds the nisab, which is calculated as 
the equivalent monetary value of 85 grams of gold. Once this 
requirement is met, zakat needs to be paid each year at the rate of 2.5 
percent. Moreover, refering to the section 44(11A) of the Income Tax 
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Act 1967, in 2005 the Government had allowed the amount of zakat 
paid by a company is to be treated as deduction of up to 2.5% of the 
aggregate income (Badawi, 2005; Othman, 2013; Bakar, 2007). 
 
2.3  Determinants of Optimal Capital Structure 
As discussed before, the optimal capital structure would 
consider several factors such as corporate tax, and cost of financial 
distress. Nonetheless, previous empirical studies also consider other 
factors that expected have influence to capital structure decision. 
Therefore, further session will discusses additional factors and how 
those factors could effect the capital structure. As Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers (1999) stated that the theory of capital structure has been 
dominated by the search for optimal capital structure. Optimums 
normally require a trade-off, for example between the tax advantages 
of debt and the costs of financial distress. 
 
2.3.1 Corporate Tax 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1963), companies should 
aim towards entire debt financing due to tax deductions associated 
with interest payments on debt. This effect encourages the use of debt 
by firms as more debt increases the after-tax earnings to the owner. 
Thus, the tax benefits of leverage should increase the value of 
reaching and maintaining the leverage target for underleveraged 
firms.  
As Byoun (2008) claimed that defining tax variables is difficult 
for individual firms, because the marginal value of the tax shield 
should be either zero or positive for all firms. However, Byoun (2008) 
calculated an average tax rate from data on both earnings before and 
earnings after tax for several developing countries, except Malaysia, 
which he used earnings before tax and taxed paid, because of the 
availability of data. Interestingly, Byoun (2008) found that the sign on 
the average tax rate is generally negative to leverage ratio. 
Meanwhile, Negash (2002) calculated effective tax rates (ETRs) 
and marginal tax rates (MTRs) as proxy of the tax variable. Effective tax 
rate is defines as the ratio of actual tax paid as reported in the cash 
flow statement and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). While, 
marginal tax rates (MTRs) computed as the ratio of change in actual 
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tax paid to change in EBIT. However, Negash (2002) also found that 
the coefficients of the two tax proxies (ETRs & MTRs) are negative to 
leverage. In addition, Negash also reveal that ETRs can explain extent 
of leverage better than MTRs. 
More recently, Sanusi (2014) utilized ratio of the total corporate 
tax over the total profit/loss before tax (EBIT). When the corporate tax 
rate is raised, firms will substitute debt for equity financing. Firms 
subject to lower corporate tax rates will employ more debt in their 
capital structure (holding earnings constant). However, her empirical 
test shows that corporate tax is not significant to leverage decision.   
Therefore, in line with the previous work, this study will utilize 
effective corporate tax rate to evaluate the effect of the value of tax 
shields on the adjustment decision. Thus, the proxy used is corporate 
tax divided by total earnings before taxes. However, this study 
hypothesize that a higher corporate tax rate leads firms to employ 
more debt in capital structure, based on static trade-off theory.  
In a nutshell, there are several other studies on the impact of 
corporate taxation on financing decisions such as by Bradley et al. 
(1984), Titman & Wessels (1988), Booth et al. (2001), & Negash (2002) 
do not consistently find a positive relation between tax status and 
financial leverage. On the other hand, MacKie-Mason (1990), Givoly et 
al. (1992), Graham (1996), and Graham et al. (1998) provide empirical 
evidence that taxes influence capital structure decisions.  
 
2.3.2 Corporate Zakat 
Since zakat payment which is paid by firms granted as an 
allowable deduction in the computation of the corporate tax, thus 
zakat payment practically treated as non-debt tax shield, likes 
depreciation deductions on income statement. Therefore, according to 
DeAngelo & Masulis (1980), if non-debt tax shields exist, firms are 
likely not to use fully debt tax shields. In other words, firms with large 
non-debt tax shields have a lower incentive to use debt from a tax 
shield point of view, and thus may use less debt.  
However, as the testable implication of comparative statics in 
Islamic capital structure modeling, the optimal level of debt is inversely 
evious 
study such as Sanusi (2014) that argue the effect of zakat to the 
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capital structure choices depends on the working capital. Therefore, it 
is expected firms with high debt financing will have low current 
liability and large working capital and zakat payment. Thus, zakat will 
encourage the firm to use equity financing. Moreover, to see the 
effect of zakat payments to capital structure decision, the proxy used 
is zakat payment divided by total earnings before taxes and zakat. 
 
2.3.3 Size 
Size is a factor that can be seen in almost every study 
investigating capital structure. Huang and Song (2006) support the 
idea that size can be used as a proxy for information asymmetries; the 
larger the firm, the more information is provided to outside investors. 
Alternatively, Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that size is likely to have 
an inverse relationship with the probability of default, thus enabling 
large firms to obtain larger amounts of leverage. According to Frank & 
Goyal (2009), firms that are mature and large in terms of assets tend 
to have higher leverage. Their empirical evidence is consistent with the 
trade-off theory because large, more diversified companies face lower 
default risk and older companies face lower debt-related agency costs 
due to better reputations in debt markets. 
However, a positive relationship between size and leverage is 
expected as the hypotheses in this study. Such a relationship is indeed 
reported by the majority of relevant papers (e.g. Booth et al., 2001; 
Guney et al., 2011; Hirota, 1999; Psillaki & Daskalakis, 2008). 
However, in this study the proxy chosen to measure size is the natural 
logarithm of sales or turnover. This measurement is supported by 
previous studies such as Rajan and Zingales (1995), Song (2005), 
Booth et al. (2001), Voutsinas and Werner (2011), Sanusi (2014), and 
Shahid et al. (2014). 
 
2.3.4 Bankruptcy Cost 
Theoretically, a firm can maximize its value by issuing as much 
debt as possible, but if the firm is using too much debt in its capital 
structure, there is a higher possibility that the firm cannot meet its 
interest and principal payment and will default on its debt obligations. 
More specifically, a firm that has difficulty and trouble meeting its debt 
obligations is in financial distress. However, the static trade-off theory 
incorporates the bankruptcy and agency costs along with the tax 
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saving benefits in the balance. Moreover, many literatures indicate 
that the existence of bankruptcy costs is to induce firms to minimize 
business risk by decreasing debt levels in their capital structures. The 
tax shield-bankruptcy costs theory of optimal capital structure 
distribution of future earnings, business risk, default costs, and taxes 
(Castanias, 1983). 
However, measuring the bankruptcy costs is a difficult task 
because one should select a measure that relies on expectations 
However, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995), the 
measurement of risk that equity holders will not be able to make fixed 
payments and will have to give up control is the coverage ratio, 
namely the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to interest 
expense.  
Meanwhile, according to Besley & Brigham (2003), firms also 
give considerable weight to financial strength indicator such as the 
times-interest-earned (TIE) ratio, which is computed by dividing 
earnings before interest and taxes by interest expense. The TIE ratio 
provides an indication of how well the firm can cover its interest 
payments with operating income (EBIT). The lower this ratio, the 
higher the probability that a firm will default on its debt and 
experience financial distress, perhaps even be forced into bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the proxy of this study in line with the previous 
study such as Sanusi (2014). However, as discussed earlier that firms 
operating in business with volatile earnings have high possibility to 
default on interest payments. Therefore, firms with a volatile earnings 
would employ less debt. The negative relationship is supported by 
empirical evidence, among others (see for examples, Castanias, 1983; 
Bradley et al., 1984; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Booth et al., 2001; Fama 
& French, 2002; De Jong et al., 2008; Sheikh & Wang, 2011).  
Despite most empirical studies that find negative relationship 
between business risk and leverage, a recent study by Dawood et al. 
(2011) contradicts it by depicting a positive relationship between 
leverage and business risk on Egyptian listed firms. According to them 
this is due to pure cultural reasons among investors in Egypt. Once the 
The Role of Corporate Zakat on Optimal Capital Structure Policy:   271 
            Evidence from Malaysian Firms 
business risk of a firm is perceived to increase, investors are expected 
to avoid purchasing its shares, making it increasingly difficult for the 
firm to raise equity financing from the stock market. As a result, the 
firm is forced to raise financing via debt thus results in a positive 
relationship between debt and business risk. 
 
2.3.5 Profitability 
In line with previous studies analysing determinants of the 
capital structure choice, the measure of profitability is earnings before 
interest payments and income taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets or 
usually called as return on assets (ROA). As Overesch & Voeller (2008) 
noted that utilizing this measurement may control variations in 
companies' profitability and also avoid endogeneity problems.  
Byoun (2008) hypotheses that a firm with higher earning with 
higher earnings could prefer to operate with either lower or higher 
leverage. Lower leverage might occur as higher retained earnings 
mechanically reduce leverage, or if the firm limits leverage to protect 
the franchise responsible for producing these high earnings. Higher 
 ability to meet debt payments out of 
its relatively high earnings cash flow. 
Voutsinas and Werner (2011) used the earnings before interest 
and debt to total assets ratio as the proxy for profitability. In addition, 
they also add the retained earning to total assets ratio as a robustness 
measure as well as a factor that will directly test for the validity of the 
pecking order hypothesis. Their study evince that profitability was 
negatively related to leverage. It is accordance with the pecking order 
hypothesis that firms indeed seem to prefer internal to external 
finance. Some other studies that also find inversely related between 
profitability and  level of debt are De Jong et al. (2008), Qian et al. 
(2009), De Jong et al. (2011), Kayo & Kimura (2011), Guney et al. 
(2011), Tongkong (2012), and Mateev et al. (2013). However, a 
positive relationship would confirm the trade-off theory and a negative 
relationship would confirm the pecking order theory.  
 
2.3.6 Tangible Assets 
As Gaud et al. (2005) stated that tangible assets are likely to 
have an impact on the borrowing decisions of a firm because they are 
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less subject to information asymmetries and usually they have a 
greater value than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy. 
Additionally, the moral hazard risks are reduced when the firm offers 
tangible assets as collateral, because this constitutes a positive signal 
to the creditors who can request the selling of these assets in the case 
of default. As such, tangible assets constitute a good collateral for 
loans. According to Scott (1976), a firm can increase the value of 
equity by issuing collateralised debt when the current creditors do not 
have such guarantee. Hence, firms have an incentive to do so, and one 
would expect a positive relation between the importance of tangible 
assets and the degree of leverage. 
Almeida and Campello (2007) showed that tangibility is 
particularly important when the firm is financially constrained and thus 
has restricted access to external resources. However, according to the 
results of Almeida and Campello (2007), tangibility is less important 
when firms are unconstrained. In addition, Voutsinas and Werner 
(2011) used the ratio of total tangible fixed assets to total assets to 
account for the asset tangibility factor. Their result show that the 
tangibility of assets factor is positively correlated with leverage. 
However, many studies indicate a positive relationship between the 
tangibility and leverage (see Almeida & Campello, 2007; De Jong et 
al., 2008; Qian et al., 2009; De Jong et al., 2011; Kayo & Kimura, 
2011; Guney et al., 2011; and Mateev et al., 2013). 
 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Theoretical Model 
As stressed previously, capital structure of the firm is an 
important thing that must be decided by the managers, as it will 
ultimately related to the firm value. How does a manager determines 
the composition of capital structure to be an important task. However, 
further discussion will be focused on develop of theoretical  model 
that consider the objectives of the study as pointed out earlier, 
especially in terms of the influence of zakat on capital structure 
decision.  
Furthermore, the theoretical model to develop the relationship 
et 
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al. (1984). Several modifications will be introduced. The modifications 
involved the construction of a static capital structure model in the 
presence of zakat. In addition, the modifications also incorporated the 
modes of Islamic debt and equity financings. The model captures the 
essence of the tax advantage and bankruptcy costs trade-off models 
of Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) and Scott (1976); the agency costs of 
debt arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977); the 
potential loss of non-debt tax shields in non-default states in 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); the differential personal tax rates 
between income from stocks and bonds in Miller (1977), and the 
extensions of Miller's model by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and 
Bradley et al. (1984). 
However, the model involves zakat payment as Islamic 
instrument  due to modeling of Islamic capital structure. In a nutshell, 
the model will treat zakat as non-tax shield that expected has effect to 
finance decision. Regarding the purpose of developing Islamic capital 
structure, this study employing the original model from Bradley et al. 
(1984), then extends that model with considering zakat payment. 
More importantly, to develop a model that represents the current state 
in the theory of optimal capital structure, the following assumptions 
have to be fulfilled: 
1. Investors are risk-neutral. 
2. Investors face a progressive tax rate on returns from bonds,    , 
while the firm faces a constant corporate tax rate,   , and also 
faces a constant zakat rate,   . 
3. Corporate and personal taxes are based on end-of-period wealth; 
consequently, debt payments (interest & principle) are fully 
deductible in calculating t -of-period tax bill, and are 
fully taxable at the level of the individual bondholder. 
4. Equity returns (dividends & capital gains) are taxed at a constant 
rate,    . 
5. There exist non-debt tax shield, such as accelerated depreciation 
and invest -of-period 
tax liability. 
6. Negative tax bills (unused tax credits) are not transferrable 
(saleable) either through time or across firms. 
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7. The firm will incur various costs associated with financial distress 
should it fail to meet, in full, the end-of-period payment promised 
to its bondholders. 
8. -of-period value before taxes and debt payments, 
 ̃, is a random variable. If the firm fails to meet the debt 
obligation to its bondholder,  ̂, the costs associated with financial 
distress will reduce the value of the firm by a constant fraction  . 
Furthermore, under the above assumptions of the model, the 
cash flow of debt and equity after corporate tax and zakat payment 
then the uncertain end-of-period pretax r
stockholders and bondholders can be written as follows: 
 
 ̃  
{
 
 
 
 
( ̃     )(       )        ( ̃) 
 
 ̃         ( ̃) 
 
  
 
 ̃  ≥  Ŷ +   /    
Ŷ ≤  ̃ < Ŷ +   /    
 ̃ < Ŷ 
 ̃  
{
 
 
 
 
  
 
 ̃ (      )    ( ̃) 
 
  
 
 ̃  ≥  Ŷ 
0 ≤  ̃ < Ŷ 
 ̃ < 0 
 
where: 
 ̃ ,  ̃   =  the gross end-of-period returns to bondholders and  
stockholders, respectively, 
 ̃         =  t -of-period value before taxes and debt 
payments, 
Ŷ        =  the total end-of-period promised payment to bondholders, 
         =  the total after-tax value of the non-debt shields if they are 
fully utilized at the end-of-period, 
         =  corporate tax rate, 
         =  corporate zakat rate,    
k        =  costs of financial distress of end-of-period value of the firm. 
 
The model modification above has been incorporate zakat 
payment as non-
earning before taxes and debt payments. More spesifically, Equation 
(1) 
(2) 
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(1) shows that if pre-tax earnings are large enough for the firm to fully 
utilize the non-debt tax shield (  /  ), then the gross end-of-period 
return to stockholders is ( ̃          )(       )            ( ̃) = 
( ̃     )(       )        ( ̃). -tax earnings are 
such that  ̃           < 0, the firm will pay no tax  but still pay zakat, 
and Assumption 6 implies that the end-of-period return to 
stockholders is  ̃         ( ̃). Meanwhile, the end-of-period pre-tax 
return to bondholders in Equation (2) follows from Assumption 8 and 
the fact that bondholders have limited liability in the event that the 
-of-period value  ̃ is negative. 
 According to Assumption 1, that of risk neutrality, Equations 
(1) and (2) provide the following beginning-of-period market value of 
and bonds (B): 
 
   ( ̃ )  ( ̃ )  
     
  
 
[∫  [( ̃   )(    )      ( ̃)] ( ̃)  ̃   ∫ ( ̃  
      
 
 
      
 )    ( ̃) ( ̃)  ̃]                                                                                                   (3) 
 
   ( ̃ )  ( ̃ )  
     
  
 
[∫   ( ̃)
 
 
 ( ̃)   ∫  ̃(   )    ( ̃) ( ̃) ( ̃)
 
 
]                         (4) 
 
where: 
S, B   
     respectively, 
E( ̃ ), E( ̃ ) = one plus the expected pre-tax rate of return from  
    stocks and bonds, respectively, 
    = one plus the rate of return on default-free, tax- 
     exempt bonds, 
f( ̃)  = probability density of  ̃, 
tps = equity returns (dividends & capital gains) are taxed  
    at a constant rate, 
tpb  = progressive tax rate on returns from bonds. 
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Furthermore, adding Equation  (3) and (4) yields the market value of 
the firm (V): 
 
   
 
  
 [(     )∫  ̃(   )    ( ̃) ( ̃) ( ̃)  
 
 
 ∫ [{( ̃   )    ( ̃)}(     )
      
 
   (     )] ( ̃) ( ̃) 
 ∫ [{( ̃   )(    )      ( ̃)}(     )
 
      
   (     )] ( ̃) ( ̃) ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
Equation (5) shows that the value of the firm is equal to the 
present value of the sum of three expected values (integrals). The first 
integral represents the situation in which is  ̃ positive but insufficient 
to meet its debt obligation. Under this condition, the payment to the 
  ̃ less total costs of financial distress, k ̃, and 
-of-period value before 
taxes and debt payments    ̃. Consistent with the assumption of a 
wealth tax, the 
financial distress, is subject to the personal tax rate tpb. 
 The second integral represents the states of world in which 
-of-period pre-tax value,  ̃, is greater than its debt 
obligation ( ) but less than the maximum level of earnings that would 
result in a zero end-of-period corporate tax bill (        ). In these 
states, the firm has no corporate tax bill; however, the payments to 
bondholders and stockholders are subject to the personal tax rates. 
Finally, the third integral defines the after-
securityholders if earnings are sufficient to pay bondholders and to 
generate a positive corporate tax liability.  
setting Ŷ, the end-of-period payment promised to bondholders, such 
that the market value of the firm is maximized. Differentiating (5) with 
respect to Ŷ yields the first order condition of Equation (6), where    is  
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the partial derivative      ⁄ . 
where F. is the cumulative of probability density function of  ̃. 
 The first term in Equation (6) represents the marginal net tax 
advantage of debt, while the second and third terms represent 
marginal expected leverage-related costs. The optimal leverage 
involves balancing the net tax advantege of debt against leverage-
related cotsts, non-debt tax shield, and zakat. 
Furthermore, in order to know the effect of each variable on 
capital structure, we can utulize the comparative statics analysis. The 
comparative statics of the leverage relevancy model can be shown by 
differentiating the optimally condition (6) with respect to each of the 
relevant exogenous variables. Differentiating     in (6) with respect to 
  ,         and     yields the following cross-partial derivatives: 
 
 
     
[ (     ) (     )]   ( )
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The cross-partial derivatives in Equations (7), (8) and (9) are 
negative. An increase in zakat payment, the cost of financial distress 
and non-debt tax shields will lead to a reduction in the optimal level of 
debt. Further, the comparative statics provide the following testable 
implications: 
1. The optimal level of debt is inversely related to the corporate 
zakat payment. 
2. The optimal level of debt is inversely related to the costs of 
financial distress, which include bankruptcy costs and the 
agency costs of debt. 
3. The optimal level of debt is inversely related to the level of 
non-debt tax shields. 
4. The optimal level of debt is positively related to the personal 
tax rate on equity. 
5. The optimal level of debt is inversely related to the marginal 
e. 
 
However, it is supported by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), 
they showed a model of corporate tax and differential personal tax, 
-
n-debt corporate tax shields suggest a 
unique interior optimum leverage decision for each firm in market 
equilibrium, no matter whether leverage-related costs are present or 
not. Based on their model, they predict that leverage of the firm is i) 
positively related to corporate tax rates; ii) negatively related to 
marginal bankruptcy costs; and iii) negatively related to the non-debt 
tax shields. 
 As alluded to earlier, according to the static trade-off theory of 
capital structure (also referred to as the tax based theory), optimal 
capital structure is obtained where the net tax advantage of debt 
financing balances leverage related costs such as financial distress and 
bankruptcy. In view of this conventional theory, issuing equity means 
moving away from the optimum and should therefore be considered 
bad news.  
Furthermore, since there is any alternative for tax payments 
namely zakat payment. As stressed earlier, the zakat payment is 
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expected to influence the capital structure decisions. Moreover, the 
comparative statics prove the implications which is negatively 
relationship between leverage of the firm and the corporate zakat 
payment. In other words, managers tend to react positively to an 
 
 
3.2  Sample and Data 
The primary source of data in this research is Bursa Malaysia. 
This study attempt to examine a panel data (unbalanced) of companies 
which listed on Main Market of the Bursa Malaysia for 14 firms that 
pay zakat and corporate tax over 16 years (1998 to 2014). This sample 
period is able to observe the capital structure due to the effects of 
fluctuations in economic activity. However, following study by Sanusi 
(2014) in Malaysia, this study will exclude the heavily regulated 
industries such as financial and securities companies as their financial 
characteristics and use of leverage is substantially different from other 
companies.   
 
3.3  Method of Analysis and Econometric Specification 
In line with the theoretical models that have been developed 
previously, corporate tax, zakat, and bankruptcy costs have influence 
on optimal capital structure decision. Thus, in order to investigate the 
consistency between theoretical hypotheses and empirical facts on 
optimal capital structure choices, the empirical method of analysis will 
utilize panel data with pooled ordinary least square (OLS). However, 
the motivation behind using the panel data for the analysis is because 
of possible information and estimation efficiencygains (Gujarati, 2004). 
Furthermore, the basic empirical model is a panel data 
explanatory variables. In general, the empirical model is expressed as; 
 
LEVit = 0i + 1 Z + 2 CTit + 3 SIZEit + 4 BCit + 5 ROAit + 6 TAit + 
 it                                                                                               (12) (12) 
where LEV is leverage, Z is zakat payment, CT is corporate tax, SIZE 
is firm size, BC is bankruptcy cost, TA is tangible assets, and  is  it 
error term. 
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Since the estimation for equation (12) uses the panel data and 
relates to individual firm, there is subject to be heterogeneity in these 
firms over time. In order to take such heterogeneity explicitly in our 
estimation procedure, several assumptions about the intercept and the 
error term have to be made. 
 
The Within-Groups Fixed Effects Model 
The Fixed Effect estimator proceeds by removing unobserved effect    
(the source of the problem) from the model, and then running OLS on 
the resulting model. Therefore, we can rewrite equation (12) as: 
 
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅              ̅    (      ̅  )    (      
  ̅̅̅̅   )    (            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅ )    (        ̅̅ ̅̅   )  
  (       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   )    (        ̅̅̅̅   )             (13) 
 
Since the fixed effect estimator relies on the within (or time series) 
variations, the effects of variables that do not change through time 
cannot be identified. 
The Random Effects Model 
In this model, the individual specific effect is characterized as random. 
By assuming the intercept value for an individual firm as: 
0i  = 0 + ui2                                                                                                                                           (14) 
 
where  ui2 is a random error term with a mean value of zero and 
variance of   
 
. Substituting equation (14) into (12), we obtain: 
LEVit = 0i + 1 Zit + 2 CTit + 3 SIZEit + 4 BCit + 5 ROAit + 6 TAit  
+  it                                                                                                                    (15)                                                                                                                                                        
 
where the error term  it consists of two components    which is the 
cross section or individual specific, error component and     which is 
the combined time series and cross section error component.  
 If the error terms of firms at two different points in time are 
correlated, the correlation coefficient, corr (wit, wis) is as follows:  
(     (       )    
    
       
   
)                                                             (16) 
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From equation (16), two features of the correlation coefficient can be 
highlighted. Firstly, the value of correlation between error terms at 
two different times remains the same for any given cross sectional 
unit. Secondly, the correlation structure given in equation (16) remains 
the same for all cross sectional unit. Hence, by employing the OLS 
estimation procedure, the resulting estimators will be inefficient. 
Therefore, the most appropriate method is the method of generalized 
least square (GLS). At this point, however, the equations are linked by 
the disturbances.  
 
The Two Way Fixed Effects Model 
A common specification in panel data models is the unbalanced two-
way fixed effects model which includes a set of fixed effects for 
primary units indexed by i
j
model is defined by: 
 
LEVit = 0 + 1 D1i + …..+ k Dki  +    +    D1t +    +    Dkt   
+    Zit +     CTit +    SIZEit +    BCit +    ROAit +    TAit  
+                                                                                                 (17) 
 
Where the model includes both individual-specific affects i and 
period-specific effects   . 
 
 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the estimation results for the pooled OLS 
model (model 1), random effect model (model 2), fixed effect model 
(model 3), fixed effect with robust standard error (model 4), OLS with 
hetero and serial correlation (model 5) and two way fixed effect 
(model 6). Generally, the R
2
 values are good enough, especially with 
two way fixed effect (0.96). The p-value is compared to the F value, 
and the null hypotheses for the F-test are rejected. Therefore, the 
estimated coefficients for all variables (except the intercept and 
constant) differ from zero. 
Furthermore, there are two basic tests to decide the best model. 
The first of these tests is the Breuch-Pagan test, and it is used to 
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discriminate between the pooled model and the random effect model. 
However, the result shows that the p-value < 0.05, reject H0. It means 
that the random effect model is more appropriate than OLS (pooled 
model). In other words there are individual specific effects in the data. 
The second test that is commonly used in applied panel data 
analysis seeks to determine which is more appropriate: random or 
fixed effects. Since we have two estimators, one efficient under the 
null, but biased under the alternative, and another unbiased under 
both, we can use the Hausman specification test. However, the result 
shows that the p-value for the test is < 5 %, reject the null hypothesis. 
This indicates that the random effects model is not appropriate and 
that the fixed effects specification is to be preferred.   
The first diagnostic check after estimation is multicollienarity 
check, detect by using variance inflation factor (vif). If mean vif>5, 
there is a multicollienarity problem. However, the result shows that  
there is no multicollienarity in the model since mean vif<5. The second 
diagnostic check is heteroskedasticity test using the Modified Wald 
Statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals of a fixed 
effect regression model (Greene, 2000). The result shows that the p-
value is <0.05, reject the H0. This meanns that the variances are not 
constant (there is a heteroskedasticity problem). Then, the third 
diagnostic check is serial correlation test using Wooldridge test or a 
Lagram-Multiplier test. The result shows that p-value is <0.05, reject 
the H0. This means that there is a serial correlation problem and 
conclude the data does have first-order autocorrelation. Further, Hook 
(2012) suggested to use the OLS with heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation robust standard error (robust cluster) to rectify the 
problem. 
In line with the diagnostic check, it can be concluded that 
model 5 (OLS with hetero and serial correlation) is the best model in 
explaining the significant level of each explanatory variable. This model 
report the significant independent variables, namely zakat, corporate 
tax, and ROA. Moreover, the sign of two independent variables is 
consistent with the hypothesis, namely Z and ROA. 
Theoretically, one of determinant that determines the capital 
structure choice of firms is the effective tax rate. Thus, from the 
perspective of the static tradeoff theory, firms with higher taxable 
The Role of Corporate Zakat on Optimal Capital Structure Policy:   283 
            Evidence from Malaysian Firms 
income should borrow more debt to take advantage of interest tax-
shield. In consequence, the effective tax rate and level of debt is 
positively correlated for firm value. Interestingly, the results from all 
the model as showed in table 3, reveals the negative correlation 
between corporate tax with leverage. However, this result is in line 
with M. Negash (2002) studied, which used 64 firms that were listed 
in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the 1991-1998 period, 
he found a negative association between the tax rate variables and 
extent of leverage.  
More interestingly, the empirical result proved that there is 
significant negative relationship between zakat and leverage. Thus, the 
results support the theoretical model that zakat would encourage firm 
to issue more equity than debt. In addition, this result also accordance 
with empirical study of Sanusi (2014) that zakat able to increase the 
equity financing by reducing the use of leverage. While, this study 
reveals that ROA as the measurement of profitability has a strong 
negative relationship with leverage. Myers (1984) suggests that 
companies seeking to reduce the costs of asymmetric information 
have a preference of funding resources (hierarchy of preference). 
Hence, companies would prefer using retained earnings firstly, then 
low-risk debt, high-risk debt, and as the last resource, new equity. 
Moreover, De Jong et al. (2008), Qian et al. (2009), De Jong et al. 
(2011), Kayo & Kimura (2011), Guney et al. (2011), McMillan & 
Camara (2012), Tongkong (2012), Mateev et al. (2013), and Islam & 
Khandaker (2015) also found a similar result that ROA inversely 
correlated with leverage. 
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1. Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics, except for Breusch-Pagan LM test, Hausman 
test, Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation, which are p-values 
2. *, ** and *** indicate the respective 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
3. a  indicates the random effect model is more appropriate than OLS 
4. b  indicates the fixed effect model better than the random effect model 
5. c  indicates no multicollinearity (vif < 5) 
6. d  indicates variances are not constant (heteroskedasticity problem) 
7. e  indicates serial correlation problem 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.1 Conclusion  
The emprical analysis investigates the panel data of 17 year firm 
leverage ratios for 14 firms which pay taxes as well zakat. The results 
shows that model 5 (OLS with hetero & serial correlation) is the best 
model in explaining the significant level of each explanatory variable. 
However, the results prove that the zakat payment is an important 
determinant which is inversely related to firm leverage. The result in 
line with the comparative statics analysis which proved that the 
optimal level of debt is inversely related to the zakat payment. The 
question on whether zakat is a prior lead to an advantage or to a 
disadvantage for the utilization of debt financings by the firm has 
given slightly point of light. The managerial option policy is expected 
to reduce debt financings because they increase the current liabilities 
and alternatively issuing more equity in consequence of corporate 
zakat payment. In addition, it can strengthen the early notion that 
zakat may promote firms to issue an equity rather than debt as a result 
 
 
5.2  Recommendation 
As discussed earlier, financing with debt not only provides 
benefit from interest tax shield but aslo generates costs of debt such 
as the risk of bankruptcy as well as agency costs. However, this study 
has showed that the presence of zakat payment will motivate firm to 
prefer equity financing sources than debt financing sources. So that, 
by choosing the issue of equity as a source of financing, the firm will 
be able to reduce the risk of bankruptcy due to debt obligations. Thus, 
the firm also can decrease the cost of interest. However, the 
bankruptcy costs and interest costs should be allocated to other 
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expenses that may improve the performance of the firm, such as 
expense for research and development as well as the cost for 
advertising and promotion. Ultimately, the increase of profits not only 
provide benefits to the owner of the company but also will raise the 
payment of zakat by the firms, which in turn contribute the benefits to 
the people who receive the zakat (shohibul maal) through the zakat 
institution. However, based on the evidence both theoretical model 
and empirical study in Malaysia. This study proposes to Indonesian 
government especially to be able consider zakat on business as part of 
tax deduction policy. Because it is not only beneficial for the business 
environment but also could improve the welfare of people in need. 
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